Validity of Compulsory Flag Salutes in Public Schools by Million, Elmer M.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 28 | Issue 3 Article 3
1940
Validity of Compulsory Flag Salutes in Public
Schools
Elmer M. Million
University of Idaho
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Million, Elmer M. (1940) "Validity of Compulsory Flag Salutes in Public Schools," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 28 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol28/iss3/3
VALIDITY OF COMPULSORY FLAG SALUTES IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
By ELMER M. M LLION*
Many and in recent years an increasing number of states
and localities have adopted statutes, regulations, or customs
requiring that all public schools display the United States flag
and that all public school students salute and pledge allegiance
to that flag.1 The validity of this compulsory salute and
pledge has been frequently contested in the last few years.
No earlier cases on the point are reported, and virtually all
of the recent disputes have involved members of a religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses which holds that saluting
the flag and pledging allegiance to it are forms of worship,
ascribing salvation to the flag or the government it represents,
and hence forbidden by God as revealed in the Holy Bible,
2
and punishable by eternal destruction.
While the wisdom and efficacy of such compulsory cere-
monies is often questioned, apparently no one asserts the
existence of any constitutional objection to their enforcement
against persons whose religious convictions are not involved.
Provisions of both Federal and state constitutions, however,
have been quoted as forbidding their enforcement against
"Witnesses" who, because of religious convictions, refuse to
observe them.
As all of the reported cases hereon are influenced by
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,3 a glance
at the facts and holding of that case is proper. Three Methodist
* Asst. Prof. of Law Univ. of Idaho, College of Law, Moscow,
Idaho. A.B. Southwestern State Teachers College (Oklahoma); LL.B.
1935, Univ. of Oklahoma; attended Yale Univ. 1936-37. Admitted to
practice in Oklahoma, 1935; instructor in law, Southern Methodist
Univ. summer 1937; Asst. Prof. of law 1937-38. Pub. articles in
Okla. Bar J.
1A Georgia statute requires the salute and pledge for the United
States flag and the state flag. Acts 1935, p. 1253.
2 Exodus, ch. xx: 3. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
4. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness
of any thing . . . 5. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor
serve them ... "
3293 U. S. 245, 79 L. Ed. 343, 55 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934).
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students of the University of California who had been suspended
for refusal to take the military training course which that
school made compulsory, 4 sought to compel their reinstatement
as students. The Methodist General Conference had renounced
war as an instrument of national policy and had petitioned the
Government to exempt from military service and from college
military training any Methodist student who conscientiously
believed that his participaion in a war was a denial of his
superior allegiance to Christ. That the three suspended
students conscientiously believed military training to be wrong-
ful and un-Christian was conceded. Denied relief by the Cal-
ifornia court,5 the students appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, invoking the clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbidding any state to enforce any law abridging the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but
were reminded by that Court that the privileges and immuni-
ties referred to were only those enjoyed as citizens of the
United States rather than as citizens of a particular state,
and the privilege of attending a state university was conferred
on them as citizens of the particular state, so was not within
the Amendment's prohibition. The "due process" and other
clauses were invoked with similar fruitlessness. The Court also
ruled that financial inability to attend college elsewhere was
immaterial, there being no requirement that the students attend
college, or that the state provide college training for all those
seeking it. Referring to the students' statement that it is a
"fixed principle of our Constitution, zealously guarded by
our laws, that a citizen cannot be forced and need not bear
arms in a war if he has conscientious religious scruples against
doing so" the Court said:
"Of course there is no such principle of the Constitution, fixed or
'The University was a land grant school, required by the Morrill
Act to provide military training for all eligible students. Some states
interpret the act as obliging the school to compel students to take the
training; a few others hold that it gives the state an option to compel
students to take training, but requires only that the training be made
available. For the latter view, see Wis. Stat. (1931) s. 36, 15; Colby,
Military Training in Land Grant Colleges (1934) 23 Geo. L. J. 1.
Contra: Johnson, Military Training in the Land Grant Colleges;
Optional or Mandatory? (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 271. The Supreme Court
has not yet settled the question, and in the Hamilton case expressly
declined to do so.
cHamilton v. Regents of University of California, 219 Cal. 663,
28 Pac. (2d) 355 (1934).
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otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation
to bear arms .. because and only because it has accoried with the
policy of Congress thus to relieve him. (If Congress) . . . withhold
the exemption . . . the native-born conscientious objector cannot suc-
cessfully assert the privilege."6
This denial by the Court that any group, including Friends,
had a constitutional right because of religious conviction to
escape the duty of bearing arms in time of war was further
emphasized in a concurring opinion in which Justice Cardozo
declared:
"The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above
the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of the government."'
The earliest reported decision involving the validity of the
compulsory salute and pledge as applied to students belonging
to Jehovah's Witnesses was Hering v. State Board of Education,8
involving the New Jersey statute which required all pupils in
public schools to observe the ceremonies each day. The plain-
tiff's two children, five and seven years old, were expelled
from public school for refusing to obey the statute. In refusing
to order their reinstatement, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in February, 1937, held that the state constitutional guaranty
of equal free schools for all did not prohibit the legislature
from requiring this patriotic ceremony in schools supported at
public expense. The court flatly denied that the salute inter-
fered with religious freedom or was in any way a religious
rite, and found further that the ceremony was not really
required, since students were not compelled to attend public
schools, but could avoid the ceremony by going to private
schools.
In April, 1937, the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts,
in Nicholls v. Mayor and School Committee of Lynn,9 rendered
a similar decision, upholding the Lynn public school rule re-
quiring the salute and pledge from all students once each week.
Plaintiff, an eight year old boy in the third grade, who had
performed the exercises during his first two years of school,
Hamirton v. Regents (etc.), 293 U. S. 245, 264, 79 L. Ed. 343,
353, 55 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934).
1Id. at 268, 79 L. Ed. at 355.
8117 N. J. L. 455, 189 Atl. 6-29 (1937), aff'd, 118 N. 3. L. 566, 194
Atl. 177 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U. S. 624, 82 L. ed. 1087, 58
S. Ct. 752 (1937).
'- Mass. -, 7 N. E. (2d) 577 (1937). Noted approvingly (1938)
36 Mich. L. Rev. 485
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now refused to do so because of his religious beliefs as a
"Witness." The school committee had voted to exclade him
from classes until he should of his own free will be willing to
comply. In refusing to compel his reinstatement, the court
held the school rule to be within the general powers conferred
upon local school boards as well as being expressly required by
a Massachusetts statute of 1935. Moreover, the statute was
upheld under both the state and Federal Constitutions, includ-
ing the state constitutional prohibition against laws prohibiting
free exercise of religion, its guaranty that no one should be
restrained from worshipping God in the manner most agreeable
to his conscience, and a statute forbidding the exclusion of
any child from a public school on account of religion. The
court conceded that the constitution guaranteed:
"absolute freedom as to religious belief and liberty unrestrained as
to religious practices, subject only to the conditions that the public
peace not be disturbed nor others obstructed in their religious worship
or the general obligations of good citizenship violated.""0
and admitted that the plaintiff had made no disturbance in
school, but ruled that the salute and pledge in no sense related
to religion, were not religious in nature, and did not interfere
with his religious beliefs. Further, his refusal to obey was in
contravention of the rules, and the absolute prohibition against
interference with religious belief did not extend to religious
practices."
In May, 1937, the Georgia Supreme Court in Leoles v.
Landers,12 upheld the expulsion of a twelve year old girl
"Witness" from the Atlanta public schools under the Georgia
statute requiring the salute and pledge to both the United
States flag and the Georgia flag. A Georgia statute required
that all children attend either a public school or a private
school which taught the ordinary courses, but the court, relying
on the Hering decision, held that students not wishing to salute
could escape by attending private school. Attendance at public
school was termed a privilege, not a right. After noting that
"Id. 7 N. E .(2d) 577, 579, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 214
Mass. 599, 601, 102 N. E. 464 (1913). A semicolon following the word
"belief" would clarify the quotation.
u A doctrine established in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878). See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333,
33 L. ed. 637 (1890).
" 184 Ga. 580, 192 S. E. 218 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U. S. 656,
82 L. ed. 507, 58 S. Ct. 364 (1937).
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the United States Constitution does not prohibit state laws
concerning religion, 13 the court held that neither the state
constitution nor the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated.
Finally, the flag salute could not "by any stretch of a reasonable
imagination" be deemed a religious rite.
Without identifying it by name, the Leoles opinion alluded
to a California case as being cited by counsel, and both dis-
approved it and pointed out a possible distinction between
its facts and the Georgia situation. Possibly'- the reference
was to a California superior court ruling of July 10, 1936, that
the expulsion of a "Witness", nine year old Charlotte Gabrielli,
from a Sacramento public grade school violated both the
state and Federal Constitutions. A writ of mandate was issued
to compel her reinstatment. 15 Subsequent to the date of the
Leoles opinion, the California district court of appeal in Gabrielli
v. Knickerbocker"0 affirmed the superior court ruling. While
basing its holding on the ground that the school board acted
arbitrarily and without first trying other means of correction,
thereby violating the statute which gives school boards power
to suspend or expel pupils for misconduct "when other means
of correction have failed to bring about proper conduct", the
opinion also made the following declarations:
(1) The expulsion violated the Declaration of Rights of
the state constitution."7 The Hering, Nicholls, and Leoles de-
cisions were distinguished as not involving any such provision.
Conceding that those decisions had established that the salute
and pledge were not religious rites, the court felt that they
had not touched upon the problem of the added guaranty of
liberty of conscience.lS
-"A rule that is unimportant since the same prohibition is found
in the state Constitution and since the Fourteenth Amendment as now
construed prohibits such legislation by the state.
-4 The writer has been unable to examine the briefs in the Leoles
case, but the above superior court ruling is the only California hold-
ing he could find which antedated the Leoles opinion.
'1 The New York Times, July 11, 1936, p. 17, col. 7.
16- Cal. A. -, 74 Pac. (2) 290 (Nov., 1937).
-' Sec. 4 of art. 1. "The free exercise of religious . . . worship,
without discrimination . . . shall forever be guaranteed ... ; but
liberty of conscience ... shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this state."
'-"The opinion continues 74 Pac. (2d) at 292: "Those cases relate
practically only to professions and form of worship .... Liberty of
conscience goes much further."
ComPuasoRy FLAG SALumS
(2) The other decisions were also distinguished as relying
on specific flag salute statutes, California having no such
statute, the requirement being only a custom, followed in the
particular school, but not universally followed even in that
county.
(3) California decisions had established that the right to
attend public school was fundamental, a vested legal right
as much as a vested right in property, hence the due process
clauses of the state and Federal Constitutions were violated.
(4) A California statute said no student should be
suspended from school for more than two consecutive weeks, but
no limit was fixed in suspending Charlotte, hence the suspension
was excessive.
On August 31, 1938, the supreme court of California' 9
reversed the district court of appeal and upheld the action of
the school board as being reasonable or at least not clearly
unreasonable. Answering the other objections in the order
raised by the earlier opinion, the Supreme Court:
(1) Held that California, like other states and the Supreme
Court, could under its constitution distinguish between religious
beliefs and religious practices, and that Charlotte's refusal
to give the pledge went beyond the question of mere belief.
2 0
(2) Inferred that the absence of a specific California
statute requiring the salute and pledge was immaterial since
another statute made it the duty of the schools to train the
children in good citizenship, patriotism and loyalty to state
and nation.
21
(3) Held that the dismissal by the United States Supreme
Court of the appeals in the Leoles and Hering cases, for want of
a substantial federal question, demonstrated that such expulsions
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. While such in-
terpretations of the United States Constitution did not require
similar construction of the same clause in the state constitution,
11 Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker 12 Cal. (2d) 85, 82 Pac. (2d) 391
(1938), appeal dismissed, 83 L. ed. (adv.) 765 (1939).
21 Citing Reynolds v. United States, sulpra, n. 11, and Hamilton v.
Regents, supra, n. 3.
a School Code 5.544 ("... duty of teachers to impress . .. prin-
ciples of patriotism; instruct in principles of a free government, and
. . . the rights, duties and dignity of American. citizenship"). The
lower court opinion had cited this statute without discussing it.
K. L. J.-4
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no cogent reason existed for a different construction so the
state would adopt the same construction.
While this argument did not expressly remark on the Cal-
ifornia holdings that children have a vested right to attend
school whereas other states had held them to have only a
privilege, the finding that the expulsion was reasonable satisfied
the "due process" requirement and made it unnecessary to
decide whether, in the last analysis, the two definitions actually
differed.
The fourth argument, citing the two weeks' limitation on
expulsions, was not directly answered. The court understood
the expulsion order to exclude Charlotte until she chose to
obey the rule. While this might exceed two weeks, it was
obviously not within the meaning of the statute, as that limita-
tion was intended to apply to punishments meted out for past
offenses, not to suspensions for continuing disobedience.
22
After Leoles v. Landers, the next flag salute case reported
was in a federal court. In Gobitis v. M inersville School Dis-
trict23 a Pennsylvania public school board had adopted a rule
requiring the salute daily from all teachers and pupils. Plain-
tiff, his fifteen year old daughter and thirteen year old son,
were all "Witnesses", protesting their loyalty to State and
Federal Governments. The children were expelled for refusing
to salute, and for a time had attended private schools. By
adding the sums the plaintiff has already spent in sending each
child to a private school, plus the sums he would have to spend
to put both through future years of school, the court found
the jurisdictional amount to be involved, so denied the school
board's motion to dismiss. Conceding that neither the First
Amendment nor the "privileges and immunities" clause had
any application, the court felt that the rule violated the
Pennsylvania constitution 24 and violated the due process clause
21 Just as statutes limiting the length of imprisonment for con-
tempt should not be deemed to apply to a continuing contempt.
ESx parte Salkin, 5 Cal. A. (2d) 436, 42 Pac. (2d) 1041 (1935).
221 F. Supp. 581 (E. D. Penm 1937); Noted: (1938) 23 Corn.
L. Q. 582.
*'Note (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, approves the decision denying
the motion to dismiss, but cites two Pennslyvania superior court
decisions and a 1935 Pennsylvania attorney general's opinion all
upholding the right of expulsion for refusing to salute. See also 2
U. of Pittsburgh, L. Rev. 206 (1936), noting a criminal prosecution
against parents for permitting children to remain away from school
after expulsion.
COMPULSORY FLAG SALUTES
of the Fourteenth Amendment by constituting a deprivation by
the state, through its local school board, of religious liberty
without due process. Acknowledging that the Hering, Nicholls,
and Leoles decisions held that the salute could have no reli-
gious significance, the court felt that such decisions erred
in not recognizing that religious liberty meant not only free-
dom to hold any belief but also freedom to do or refuse to do
any act, on conscientious grounds, where the safety, property
or personal rights of the public were not involved. Hamilton
v. Regents, supra, was distinguished first on the ground that
refusal to take military training might endanger the public
safety, which a mere refusal to salute the flag could in no
way do; secondly, that while attendance at college was a privi-
lege, attendance at public schools was both a right and a duty
under Pennsylvania law.2 5 Subsequently, the court issued the
injunction prayed for,26 enjoining the school board from re-
quiring the plaintiff's children to give the flag salute before
permitting them to attend the public school. Adopting its
previous opinion, the court added:
"... the refusal of these . . . children to salute the flag cannot
even remotely prejudice or imperil the safety, health, morals, property
or personal rights of their fellows .... The loyalty of our people is to
be judged not so much by their words as by the part they play in the
body politic.' '-
Six months later in, Johnson v. Town of Deerfield,28 a dif-
ferent federal district court upheld the compulsory flag salute
requirement of a Massachusetts local school board, denying an
injunction against its operation and upholding its validity
under the United States Constitution. The school board rule
was in accordance with the previously mentioned Massachusetts
statute requiring all public school teachers to cause their pupils
to salute and pledge allegiance. As the Nicholls decision had
upheld the statute's validity under the state constitution, the
court held that question settled. The Supreme Court's denial
2 The court failed to state that a similar requirement of attend-
ance existed in Georgia and other states which termed school attend-
ance a privilege. Note that the final Gabrielli decision, which had not
yet been rendered at the date of this federal opinion, upheld the
expulsion despite the existence of a right to attend school.
- Gobitis v. Minersille School District, 24 F. Supp. 271 (E. D.
Penn. 1938).
-wId. at 274.
S2 5 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass., Jan. 1939), aff'd, 83 L. ed. (adv.) 765
(1939).
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of the appeals in the Leoles case and the Hering case similarly
established the validity of such regulations under the United
States Constitution.
Citing Reynolds v. United States29 and Hamilton v. Regents,
supra, in which the Supreme Court had held that a person can-
not excuse a practice contrary to statute merely because of his
religious belief, the court conceded that the statutes in those
cases (one forbidding polygamy and the other requiring military
training) had a more obvious public necessity than the flag
statute, but accepted the judgment of the state court that the
latter statute bore a reasonable relation to some legitimate
state purpose.
Regarding Gobitis v. Minersville School District, supra,
the court pointed out that the Supreme Court decisions were
controlling, but that the Gobitis decision might even be recon-
ciled on the ground that it involved a school rule which it held
void under the state constitution, which was not the case in
Massachusetts. Concerning the right of a student to attend
public school, the court pointed out that although such a right
existed it was not absolute but was subject to reasonable con-
ditions imposed by the state.
In New York the problem reached the courts because Grace
Sandstrom, a thirteen year old girl "Witness" attending a
public school, was expelled for refusing to salute the flag.
Her parents were convicted by a Justice court jury of violating
the statute making it the duty of parents to send their children
to school. The county court affirmed the conviction.3 0  A
further appeal to the court of appeals brought a reversal and
dismissal of the information, the court holding that the evidence
showed the parents had caused Grace to return to school each
time after her expulsion for refusing to salute,31 and therefore
were not guilty of any wrong, although Grace would be sub-
ject to summary punishment if she persisted in her refusal.
The New York statute requiring the commissioner of
education to prepare for use in the public schools a program
of patriotic exercises, including the flag salute, was upheld as
" 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878). (No Constitutional objection
to forbidding the practice of polygamy by Mormons although they were
free to retain it as a religious belief.)
People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 167 Misc. 436, 3 N. Y. Supp.
(2d) 1006 (1938). Note (1938) 13 St. John's L. Rev. 144 (approving).
&'If. 279 N. Y. 523 18 N. B. (2d) 840 (Jan. 1939).
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constitutional and as not a religious rite. The opinion relied on
Hamilton v. Regents, supra, and emphasized that public opinion
and loyalty were as vital to good government as military train-
ing, so that the state was justified in taking measures to
engender patriotism in the young. Said the court:
'The state cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of
measures for its own peace and safety until revolutionary utterance
and acts lead to actual disturbance of the public peace or imminent and
Immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may . . seek to pre-
vent evil in its incipiency. Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268
U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138. '"
Observing that it is the partiotic devotion evidenced by the
salute rather than the compulsory ceremony itself which the
statute seeks to develop, the court suggested that before
treating Grace summarily for refusing, the school authorities
should try reasoning and persuasion, coupled with tact.
Sympathetic treatment, the court felt, would soon obtain obe-
dience since the salute statute:
".... has In substance been upon the statute books since 1898, a
period of forty years. This is the first time that any trouble has arisen
regarding its enforcement .... "3
Judge Lehman, concurring separately, conceded that the flag
salute was not a religious rite, but felt that the constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom and liberty of conscience forbade
compelling the salute by anyone thinking it to be a religious
rite. Forcing Grace to choose between obeying her school
teacher or obeying what she understood to be the command of
God, even though all judges agreed that no reasonable person
could object to the salute and even though Episcopalians,
Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, Catholics, and Jews all
saluted unprotestingly, seemed inexcusable to Judge Lehman
and not intended by the legislature. Emphasizing the futility
of flag salutes where unaccompanied by the love and respect they
are supposed to symbolize, he concluded:
"The flag cherished by all our hearts should not be soiled by the
tears of a little child. The Constitution does not permit, and the
Legislature never intended, that the flag should be so soiled and
dishonored.""'
32Id. 18 N. E. (2d) at 842.
DId. 18 N. E. (2d) at 844.
"Id. 18 N. E. (2d) at 847. Judge Lehman's arguments are those
of the district court of appeal in Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker: The
existence of a vested right to attend school, freedom of religious prac-
tces except where inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state,
KENTUCEY LAw JOURNAI
Many other controversies arose between "Witnesses" and
school authorities seeking to enforce the flag salute, but most
of them did not or have not yet reached the appellate courts.
First becoming noticeable in 1935, the contests arose in many
sections. Newspaper accounts included stories of the enactment of
flag salute statutes by additional states, resolutions by patriotic
and other groups in favor 35 of or opposed 36 to such statutes,
regulations by school boards requiring such salutes even in the
absence of statutes,37 a ruling by the Arizona attorney general
that students were subject to expulsion for refusal to salute,38
and a ruling by the Washington attorney general that school
authorities had no authority to expel students for refusing to
salute.3 9 In addition to the children involved in the reported
cases already discussed, many other public school pupils,
"Witnesses", were expelled. In 1935, although Connecticut
had no flag statute, a Norwalk, Connecticut, high school boy
was suspended from the school assemblies until he should join
willingly in the assembly salute,40 a Lakewood, New Jersey,
football-playing student was expelled permanently after the
expiration of one week of grace in which he remained absent
from school rather than salute,4 1 at least six grade school pupils
in Saugus, Massachusetts, refused to salute42 as had one teacher
at Lynn, Massachusetts, 4 3 at least nine pupils having been
expelled in that state by mid-November, 44 and a thirteen year
old objector had been denied admittance to a Massachusetts
academy.45 In 1936, three Massachusetts students ranging
and no such danger threatened by mere refusal to salute the flag. The
New York Constitutional guaranty of liberty of conscience is identical
with the California provision which the court of appeal had sought to
distinguish from the Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Jersey
provisions.
"New York Times, Nov. 1, 1935, p. 23, col. 8 (Veterans of Foreign
Wars, in Northern Ohio).
aId. Oct. 19, 1935, p. 34, col. 4 (Six thousand Massachusetts school
teachers in convention).
171d. Nov. 1, 1935, p. 23, col. 7 (Chicago school board decree that
all public school pupils must sing the National Anthem, salute and
pledge allegiance to the flag every school day).
"Id. Feb. 10, 1939, p. 17, col. 2.
" Spokane (Wash.) Daily Chronicle, Mar. 18, 1939, p. 1, col. 8.
"New York Times, Oct. 20, 1935, p. 37, col. 2.
"Id. Nov. 6, 1935, p. 29, col. 4; Nov. 14, p. 24, col. 2.
42Id. Oct. 9, 1935, p. 25, col. 5; Oct. 10, 1935, p. 27, col. 3
" Id. Nov. 14, 1935, p 24, col. 2
"Ibid.
,Id. Oct. 19, 1935, p. 34, col. 7 (Arms Academy, Shelburne Falls).
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from nine to fifteen years of age, who for two weeks had
refused to salute and pledge allegiance were convicted of
delinquency and committed to the training school for the dura-
tion of their minority or until discharged according to law.
4 6
Newspaper accounts during 1939 include the expulsion in Fort
Lee, New Jersey, of two high school "Witnesses", sons of a
wounded World War veteran, 47 and the expulsion of two rural
Arizona grade school pupils,4 8 and the veto by Governor Olson
of the California flag salute statute.
Instances are reported of seemingly excessive conduct on
both sides. The mayor of lonessen, Pennsylvania, was reported
as having fined sixty-eight women and girls and eighty men and
boys, all "Witnesses", the sum of five dollars each for coming
to town to arouse public opinion against him for closing a
private school conducted for children of the sect.4 9 The father
of the boy whose explusion was upheld in Nicholls v. Mayor (etc.)
of Lynn, supra, had attended the school with a "friend" and
sat through the ceremony in which the son refused to take
part. Both men were jailed for disturbing school,50 and each
was fined twenty-five dollars. Both fines were paid.51
Of the decisions passing on the salute all of the state
courts of last resort have upheld it, as has one federal dis-
trict court, with only one federal district court decision to
the contrary reported.52  The dismissal by the Supreme Court.
for lack of a substantial federal question, of the appeals in
"Gardner and Post, Constitutional Questions Raised by the Flag
Salute and Teacher's Oath Act in Massachusetts (1936), 16 B. U. L.
Rev. 803 (adding that the three children had appealed).
" New York Times, April 15, 1939, p. 19, col. 1.
8The Spokesman-Review (Spokane, Wash.), March 26, 1939, p. 2.
' The New York Times, May 26, 1936, p. 2, col. 3.
50Id. Oct. 1, 1935, p. 9, col. 2. The "friend" had not known Nicholls
previously and was not himself a "Witness"; but, as an enemy of
tyranny, accompanied him to the school and encouraged him in his
opposiiton.
5LThe "friend" did not appeal his own conviction, because of
injuries received in the Sacco-Vanzetti case years before. Id. Oct. 10,
1935, p. 27, col. 3. Nicholls said he dropped his appeal because the
sect opposes the instigation of trouble as well as homage to man-made
symbols. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1935, p. 23, col. 4. Different as the
two men were by nature and in purpose, it seems likely that both
were guilty of the offense charged against them, independently of the
propriety of the expulsion of the boy, because they had entered the
school, sat through the pledge and although ordered to leave by the
teacher, refused to go and were removed by police.
"Gobitis v. Minersville School District, 24 F'. Supp. 271 (E. D.
Penn. 1938). A Supreme Court ruling on this case, if upholding the
school authorities, should certainly put the question at rest.
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Leoles v. Landers, Hering v. State Board of Education, and
Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, and its memorandum affirmance of
Johnson v. Deerfield, would seem sufficient proof of Court
approval of the legality of the compulsory salute and pledge,
even in the absence of a statute expressly requiring it.
As to the validity of such statutes or regulations in the
remaining states, it is submitted that no sound basis exists
for invalidating them on the ground that the particular state
recognizes that children have a right to attend school rather
than a privilege. Some states upholding the statutes do hold
that the pupil has only a privilege, not a vested right, but
other states holding the pupil to have a right to attend school
nevertheless have upheld the validity of the statutes53 , or
the regulations made by school boards in the absence of statute.5 4
Furthermore, even the states which term school attendance
a privilege do not permit it to be withdrawn aribtrarily from a
given individual, and the states calling it a right consistently
hold it to be subject to reasonable regulations. This leaves
little or no difference between the two positions. The require-
ment that children attend public school reveals a difference
between these cases and the decision of Hamilton v. Regents,
but no ground for distinction exists, as most of the decisions
already upholding the compulsory salute arose in states where
the children involved were required to attend school. Nor
should financial inability to attend a private school be material.
The presence in the state constitution of a clause guaranteeing
liberty of conscience does not warrant a different result from
that reached in a state having merely a guaranty of freedom of
worship, California and New York having squarely held adversely
to any such distinction. Whether the courts were correct in
holding that the salute is absolutely not a religious rite, it
must be conceded that "Witnesses" are privileged to believe
otherwise, however irrational that belief. But the refusal to
salute goes beyond mere belief and becomes a matter of religious
practice, which can be regulated where public welfare requires.
Since public welfare always requires true patriotism, validity
of the compulsory salute turns on whether it is a reasonable
Nicholls v. School Committee, supra, n. 9, and Johnson v. Deer-
field, supra, n. 28.
5Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. (2d) 85, 82 Pac. (2d) 391
(1938), appeal dismissed, 83 L. ed. (adv.) 765, 59 S. Ct. 786 (1939).
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means of attempting to develop patriotism, and whether the
dangers lurking in the refusal to salute are so grave or
potentially grave as to justify such regulation. The courts
have answered affirmatively.
The desirability and wisdom of such compulsion is another
matter. For states wishing to leave that decision to the local
communities but fearing that lack of a statue might cause
courts to question the need of or authority for such regulation,
statutes permitting local school boards to require the salute
might be desirable. Or the statutes might exempt people having
religious scruples, or give the local authorities authority to
exempt them. Conscientious objectors might even be excused
from the school room during the ceremony, just as children
having religious scruples against hearing the Bible read in
school have been permitted to leave during such instruction.
Objection to exemption might arise because the presence of non-
participating spectators would be offensive to some patriots,
as well as giving no indication as to whether those exempted
had any loyalty at all. Excusing from the room would remedy
the first but not the second of those objections.
A further concession, in keeping with the American tradi-
tion of comparatively unlimited freedom of religious activity,
would be the provision of salute and pledge substitutes for such
objectors which would serve to express their loyalty in some
way acceptable alike to them and to the public generally, much
as other conscientious objectors have been permitted to affirm
instead of swearing oaths.
An invitation by the state authorities for the leaders of
Jehovah's Witnesses to propose suitable substitutes might well
bring about a solution worthy of the highest American tradition
and satisfactory to all save the most extreme patrioteer, pro-
fessional malcontent, or thirster for the martyr's crown.
ADD M=u.-Sinee the foregoing was written, these further
developments have been reported by the New York Times, cita-
tions to which appear in parenthesis:
Vivian Hering, after her expulsion in 1935, attended private
school for a time, later returning to Secaucus, where she was
again expelled, September 21, 1939, for again refusing to salute
or pledge allegiance. (Oct. 3, p. 25, col. 2).
On November 10, 1939, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
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unanimously affirmed Gobitis v. Minersvwle, supra note 23, and
quoted a 1789 declaration by George Washington that "con-
scientious scruples of all men should be treated with great
delicacy and tenderness. (Nov. 11, p. 17, col. 3). An appeal to
the Supreme Court is probable.
On November 30, 1939, three school pupils, all Witnesses,
were expelled from the Union City, New Jersey, schools, for
refusing to salute. One of those expelled was Vivian Hering!
(Dec. 1, p. 12, col. 4).
England has reportedly exempted from military service its
Jehovah's Witnesses who asserted their religious convictions
against war.
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